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THE DEEP ROCK DOCTRINE RECONSIDERED I
DAVID C. BAYNE, SJ.t
ELEVEN years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States in an
opinion written by Justice Roberts, disdaining precedent, banded
down its adjudication in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Company1
Out of this opinion was born the "Deep Rock doctrine." The Deep
Rock is the Deep Rock Oil Corporation. It still exists. In the times of
the litigation, and before, it was the subsidiary of the Standard Gas &
Electric Company.
As for the "doctrine," it is the statement, more or less, of the holding
in the Taylor case, now more commonly known as "the Deep Rock
case." There should be some definition of the "doctrine," but its very
nature renders this difficult. There will be stated, however, the attempts
at definition of others,' for a working beginning. A writer in a recent
article3 phrases the "doctrine" in the words of another:
"Where a showing can be made that a subsidiary corporation having public
preferred stockholders was inadequately capitalized from the outset, and was
managed substantially in the interest of its parent, rather than its own interests,
the parent will not, in a bankruptcy or reorganization proceeding affecting the
subsidiary, be permitted to assert a claim as a creditor, except in subordination
to the claims of preferred stockholders."
This statement represents in a general way the holding in the Deep
Rock case, and serves only the limited purpose here of introducing the
subject.
Once Justice Roberts expressed the Court's opinion in the Deep Rock
case, it was snatched up. Every year thereafter found articles, com-
ments and notes? Thus the "doctrine" grew. Each added thoughts on
the matter, interpreted it and hailed its advantages. The courts took it
up also, from the Supreme Court to the lowest court.
The holding in the Deep Rock case and the "Deep Rock doctrine"
entwine themselves inextricably in the general field of the law of parent
and subsidiary corporations and in the particular field surrounding the
well known "instrumentality rule."' Some have contended that "Deep
Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
2. See BE=LE, CASES AND MATEPIALS ON TME LAW or Busnrrss OrnxxzAnM:s (ConPo-
RATIOxs) 156 (1947).
3. Note 47 CoL. L. REv. 800 (1947).
4. Citations of the commentaries, infra.
5. LAr, SuBsmnuuEs A n A STED CoRpoRATio.;s 191 (1926). A fuller treatment of
this problem will be given a propos.
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Rock" was right in line with the instrumentality tradition, others have
denied it; but almost all have condoned the holding and approved the
"doctrine."
It is frankly the hope that this commentary will be of some help in
clarifying the thought that has somehow become uncertain in the matter
of the "Deep Rock doctrine."
The reason for this hope lies in the very thesis of this article: (1) That
the "Deep Rock doctrine" essentially impugns the "instrumentality
rule"; that it might be said to repudiate it, but at least it may be said
to be a failure to carry through the instrumentality principle to its reason-
able conclusion; (2) that because of questionable logic at the founda-
tion of the reasoning, the formulation of any working principle is at best
fraught with danger; (3) that this intrinsically questionable logicality
renders prediction uncertain and confused; (4) that consequent on these
points, the most prudent course would be, it is submitted, abandonment
of the holding as a doctrine. This is the thesis of this article.
The proof of this thesis will be attempted in five parts. PART I: ANTE-
CEDENTS; PART II: LITIGATION; PART III: ANALYSIS OF THE ADJUDICA-
TION; PART IV: DEEP ROCK AS A DOCTRINE; PART V: SUBSEQUENT HIS-
TORY OF THE DOCTRINE, AND CONCLUSION.
PART I: ANTECEDENTS
One of the predominant causes of misunderstanding in the analysis of
Deep Rock as a doctrine appears to have been an insufficient knowledge
of the facts. The likelihood of this necessitates a factual perusal beyond
the ordinary.
History
The beginnings of the Deep Rock Oil Corporation were founded in
H. M. Byllesby and Company, (hereafter referred to as "Byllesby") a
Chicago investment banking house and later top holding company of a
billion dollar empire.6
Of chief interest to Deep Rock was its parent Standard Gas and
Electric Company, a holding company in the utility field, controlled by
Byllesby. As the years progressed) Byllesby erected affiliates and sub-
sidiaries in all activity areas requisite to a full vertical structure in the
organization, underwriting, refinancing, management, technical engineer-
ing and general supervision of public utility companies. Relative to Deep
Rock the major supervision and management responsibility was in the
6. Intervener's Exhibit 12, Transcripts of Records and File Copies of Briefs, No. 312,
1938, in Volume II of the RzcoRo at p. 688. Henceforward a brief citation will be used,
thus: R. and B., II, 688. See also Summary of Exhibits, R. and B., II, 603.
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Byllesby Engineering and Management Company " ... given to Standard
gratis in order to help it and give it an earning statement."'
The post-war recession led to the purchase by Byllesby of the Shaffer
Oil and Refining Company, an operating company, renamed Deep Rock
for $15,000,000. From the time of Shaffer's retirement in 1921 Standard
was in complete control8 and owned substantially all of the common stock
of Deep Rock.'
Standard was now in" ... the oil business, a wholly unrelated in-
dustry . . . "" to its usual public utilities. From 191911 the structure
developed to a state in 1928 when the bulk of the common, at $1 par
value, was in Standard and the preferred, at $100 par value and $10,-
000,000 in notes were in the hands of 5,500 public holders across the
country. There was no time when " ... there was preferred stock out-
standing in sufficient amount to outvote the common stock held at the
time by Standard.... ,,l
The Byllesby Management Company, Standard and Byllesby had
common directors. Deep Rock and Standard had common auditors, at-
torneys, and officers. The officers of Deep Rock, chosen for technical
experience, were allowed some discretion in operation, but were always
subject to the direction of Standard. All fiscal affairs were wholly con-
trolled by Standard, which was banker and the only source of financial
aid.a3
Intercompany Relations
The activities of Standard and Deep Rock spanned fourteen years-
1919 to 1933. During that time the "open-account" indebtedness of Deep
Rock to Standard grew and fluctuated over the years so that it reached
the sum of $9,000,000 by 1933, chiefly through rentals, supervision fees,
dividends, and interest charges.
The rental charges. In 1923 Byliesby had added the Deep Rock Oil
and Refining Company to the system. "The Refining Company has its
office with the Deep Rock.... It didn't have any employees. All the
7. John J. O'Brien, President of Byllesby, Standard and Deep Rock, testimony before
the Special Master, R. and B., II, 2.
8. 306 U.S. 307, 310 (1939).
9. 96 F. 2d 693, 697 (10th Cir. 1938).
10. Id. at 696.
11. "At organization Deep Rock had a cash working capital of only about $6A0,CG0C
and a mortgage indebtedness of $12,000,000, the interest and sinking fund requirements of
which were nearly $2,000,000 a year. Its assets at that time were appraised at about
$16,000,000." 306 U.S. 307, 315 (1939).
12. Report of the Specal Master, Preston C. West, R. and B., I, 176.
13. 306 U.S. 307, 311 (1939).
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salaries of the Refining Company were paid by the Deep Rock.... The
Refining Company had no bank account."14 In short, it was "a purely
inactive dummy corporation,"'" and all "the capital stock of said Deep
Rock Oil & Refining Company, with the exception of qualifying shares,
was issued to Deep Rock, thereby creating it the beneficial owner of all
the properties of said corporation."' 0 During the years prior to the Re-
fining Company, Deep Rock had expanded. A cracking plant had been
added at over a million and a half dollars, 7 new properties costing
$2,000,000 were purchased.' 8 At its organization in 1923 all these prop-
erties were placed in the hands of the Refining Company. Then,-"Later
as the result of transactions reflected on the books of the three corpora-
tions, Standard became the owner of the entire capital stock of the Re-
fining Company."'
Standard then announced that Deep Rock " . . . will then lease the
property of the Deep Rock Oil and Refining Company and ... will pay
rental of $600,000 per annum .... "20 "By this lease Deep Rock became
the lessee of the very properties which it had purchased, paid for and
operated as its own throughout the entire three year period since their
acquisition.""
After the Refining Company came into the rentals as income, it de-
clared it as dividends to Standard. But, "no checks were drawn, it was
just a bookkeeping transaction."22 The "dividends on the Refining Com-
pany's stock were charged by Standard against Deep Rock in lieu of the
Refining Company first collecting the $50,000 monthly irental under the
lease and then paying it over to Standard as a monthly dividend."23
The total for the period come to $4,500,000.
While Standard was building up the open account, Deep Rock was
losing $1,600,000 in the operations of the leased properties. Although
Standard owned the properties, Deep Rock spent $2,000,000 in improv-
ing them.24 Mr. Shinners, Vice President of Byllesby, thought the terms
14. R. and B., II, 105.
15. Statement in Petition for Writ of Certiorari, R. and B., Vol. 92. Page 12 of Brief.
Citations in support given: R. and B., I, 113, II, 36, 105, 6, 191, 2, 198, 294.
16. From the Answer and Reply of Standard Gas & Electric Co., R. and B., II, 294.
17. R. and B., II, 19-24, 26, 108-9, 193, 218-22, 226-7, III, 148.
18. Ibid., II, 34-6, 44-6, 128-9, 176-7, 194-5, 227.
19. 96 F. 2d 693, 697 (10th Cir. 1933). But there is no evidence of consideration.
20. R. and B., II, 607.
21. Briefs, Vol. 92, Page 45 of the brief of petitioners.
22. Testimony of G. W. Knourek, accountant for the Standard system, R. and B., II,
95. Also see: R. and B., H, 75.
23. R. and B., II, 23-4. Also 306 U.S. 307, 319 (1938).
24. Id. at II, 176-7, 17, I, 134-5.
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of the lease "were excessive."' Yet the lease was renewed for five more
years in 1930. Mr. Riddle who signed for Deep Rock, stated he would
not have been in a position to protest.20
Beyond the straight rental charges Standard billed Deep Rock for
the Federal taxes" on the rental income, insurance premiums,2s deprecia-
tion losses, depletion and retirement accounts.'
Supervision fees. In i930 the Management Company billed Deep
Rock $2,000,000 as supervision fees for the year ending December 31st,
1930.30 The total for the fourteen year period came to about $1,500,000.
No one was able to reveal what services were performed.' The work
of making stock transfers and keeping stock registers would come to
about $25,000 over the whole period 2 J. J. O'Brien, president of the
companies, declared: "We knew nothing about the oil business at that
time."3 3 There was no contract for the services or the charges. 4 Nor
did the president have any knowledge as to "how the amount of the
charges that were made for these managerial fees were arrived at.'"
These supervision charges brought the open account to $6,052,682.83.
Dividends. In spite of the fact (as President O'Brien put it) that
"Deep Rock was about two feet in front of the wolf,"'3 0 Standard or-
dered the declaration of dividends. Standard did not feel that the
question as to the availability of that much cash in the accounts of Deep
Rock had anything to do with this method of handling dividends rather
than by actual payment?7 Nor was there any concern over the fact that
Deep Rock "was, at the time, borrowing in large amounts from or
through Standard." 38 The total declared to Standard in dividends was
over $4.5 million. This brought the open account to $10,638,695.83.
25. Id. at I, 431.
26. Id. at 1l, 230.
27. Id. at II, 81-2.
28. Id. at II, 202-3.
29. Id. at 1, 216.
30. Id. at MI, 83, Exhibit 2 to Kerrs answer to 25th interrogatory; also, Ibid., 1, 62.
31. Id. at II, 4-5, 7, 9-10, 14-16, 27, 29, 40, 41, 55-59, 27-8, 239.
32. Id. at 11, 57-8.
33. Id. at 11, 4.
34. Id. at U1, 28, 244.
35. Id. at 11, 7. Mr. Shinners, Standard's vice president testified that the management
fees were excessive and should be eliminated since they did not represent services actually
rendered and that the charges were fixed by the "same top men, who were top men in all
these companies." R. and B., H1, 433, 434.
36. Id. at II, 10, 11.
37. Id. at II, 88, 89; also I, 61.
38. 306 U.S. 307, 317 (1939). See R. and B., I1, 90, 93 where it is shown that Deep
Rock had neither surplus nor earnings with which to pay any dividends; see also H1, 7,
16, 26, 35, 37, 88-9, 224.
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Interest charges. On the substantial sums already owing Standard
by Deep Rock interest was charged at the rate of seven percent, com-
pounded monthly. There was no consideration of the questionable nature
of the debts represented by the open account. The interest amounted
to six million dollars during the fourteen years.39 The total now reached:
$17,087,136.52.
General activity. While the foregoing major items were building
up the Deep Rock debt, Standard and Byllesby were engaging in side
activities that were substantially lucrative. Byllesby and Standard
effected many stock and note issues.4" Byllesby was principal and agent
in trading with the public in Deep Rock securities. 4 There were instances
that might be called market manipulation. 42 At times the public valua-
tions of Deep Rock,43 the prospectuses44 and the annual reports4 were
declared questionable in their reliability.
The Court concluded by reference to the numerous transactions bene-
ficial to Standard effected by Standard domination.40  The capitulation
of all questionable charges of Standard against Deep Rock came to
approximately $20,000,000.
PART II: LITIGATION
Such was the state of affairs in 1933 when Deep Rock was first brought
into court. Gray and Riddle,47 Deep Rock officers, initiated receivership
proceedings in the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, but Deep
Rock had the cause removed immediately to the District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma.
The Special Master
Once in the District Court receivers were appointed, 8 Standard filed
a petition of intervention49 and a claim for $9,342,642.37, which was the
39. R. and B., I, 61; II, 86-7.
40. Id. at II, 11, 114, 420. See also, 306 U.S. 307, 315-316 (1938).
41. See note 40 and R. and B., II, 421.
42. R. and B., II, 421, 508-11, 642.
43. Id. at 254, 297, 593-605; III, 103-114. See also 306 U.S. 307, 319 (1939).
44. Id. at II, 258, 297.
45. Id. at II, 593-605; I, 103-114; see also III, 90-93. Thus the prospectus for the
note sale listed the refinery as a Deep Rock asset while Standard claimed it in its annual
report and collected rentals on it from 1925 to 1933. Report of the Securities and Exchange
Commission on proposed Plans of Reorganization.
46. 306 U.S. 307, 320 (1939).
47. From 1924 to 1933 Deep Rock was under the management of Gray and Riddle.
Each of them owned securities of Deep Rock and neither had any interest in Standard or
Byllesby. 96 F. 2d 693, 697 (10th Cir. 1938).
48. R. and B., II, 245, 687.
49. Id. at II, 245.
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balance owing on the open account. (The $20,000,000, represented the
alleged wrongful charges and would, if verified, absorb the nine million
odd dollars claim of Standard and result in an eleven million dollar
residue.) G. S. Ramsey was retained by the receivers, filed his answer
to Standard and requested the appointment of a Special Master. The
answer attacked the Refining Company leases, called all the Byllesby
companies, "(mere agents, instrumentalities and adjuncts" of Standard,
utilized by Standard for the purpose of transacting the latter's business
and demanded that the separate corporate entity of Deep Rock be
judicially ignored and a proper and equitable judgment and decree en-
tered adjudging Standard indebted to Deep Rock0
The Special Master was appointed and began hearings. Standard was
present, not as proprietor or owner, but as simple creditor. Deep Rock
countered with the $20,000,000 in allegedly wrongful charges. Shortly
thereafter Deep Rock filed its petition in bankruptcy, under Section 77B
of the Bankruptcy ActP1 Ramsey was retained by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy and the hearings continued. All of the witnesses were officers,
directors, or agents of Standard, or its affiliates, and officers of the Deep
Rock and the documentary evidence came from the books and records
of Standard and Deep Rock. The facts were essentially uncontroverted.
At this point Byllesby determined to form a reorganization committee
and to submit a plan of reorganization. The Committee was headed by
John J. Shinners, Standard's vice-president, and was composed of men
not directly connected with the Byllesby system, but more or less remote
associates5 2 The court acquiesced in the representation and notices to
creditors were orderedY3 "The committee recognized that the validity
and extent of the Standard claim was an important element in the formu-
lating of any plan of reorganization .... It proceeded at once with an
independent and careful study of the relationship and transactions be-
tween Deep Rock, Standard, Byllesby, the Management Corporation, and
the Refining Company." 4 It was significant when in 1934 counsel for
the committee advised its members that Standard would have to be con-
sidered in any reorganization plan, since in their opinion the instru-
mentality rule was not applicable and Standard could establish a claim in
the approximate amount of $7,300,000.00."
50. Id. at II, 290.
51. Section 77(b) of the Bankruptcy Act was formerly 45 Stat. 912, 11 U.S.C. 207(b).
The drastic amendments of the Chandler Act (52 Stat. 839, 11 U.S.C. 501 et seq.) bave
today superseded that section.
52. R. and B., I, 68.
53. Id. at I, 71, 78.
54. 96 F. 2d 693, 699 (10th Cir. 1938).
55. Ibid.
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With this advice from counsel, the committee advanced its plan of re-
organization predicated upon the allowance of the Standard claim for
at least $5,000,000.00, of which a substantial amount was to rank on a
parity with the Deek Rock notes. The plan provided for the elimination
of Deep Rock's preferred shareholders, and a new two and a half million
dollar issue of preferred stock entirely in favor of Standard.50 Standard
also was to receive three-fourths of the common stock of the reorganized
company. Ten percent of the common was to go to the old preferred
holders.
With the end of 1934 the hearings before the Special Master were
closed by both sides.57 Standard had steadfastly asserted its claim. Ram-
sey for the trustee opposed it. In over four hundred and twenty-five
pages of brief he had excoriated the Refining Company deal, branded
the lease "unconscionable" and "fraudulent," cited the dividends, the
interest charges, and the supervision fees."8 He alleged a clear case of
domination of Deep Rock by Standard. At this point the record is not
too explicit in details, and the fact alone is noted that Mr. Shinners, of
Standard, paid a call on Mr. Ramsey, counsel for the trustee.0 Hence-
forward the change of attitude of the counsel for the trustee is notable.
It was also about this time that the Taylor brothers who had "bought
this security entirely upon the recommendation of Byllesby & Com-
pany, .... ,60 entered upon the scene. They had invested about $50,000
in preferred stock of Deep Rock and now feared for their interests. The
Taylors retained their own counsel and henceforward the full prosecu-
tion of Deep Rock interests was in their hands. On February 21, 1935-
exactly eight days after the closing of the hearings before the Special
Master-they intervened in the bankruptcy proceedings, filed their ob-
jections to Standard's claim,6 strongly denied that the trustee could
protect their interest, and adopted as their own the arguments of Ramsey.
Shortly after Shinners had suggested compromise of the Standard
claim the trustee filed a petition reporting the offer to the Court and
requesting authority to accept it.62 This was in the face of statements
made previously-and subsequently-that were in considerable deroga-
tion of such a stand.6
56. R. and B., II, 823.
57. Id. at II, 218, 241.
58. Brief of Trustee, passirt, Vol. 92, Briefs.
59. 96 F. 2d 693, 699 (10th Cir. 1938).
60. Intervenor's Exhibit No. 13-C, R. and B., II, 510.
61. R. and B., I, 97-102.
62. 96 F. 2d 693, 700 (10th Cir. 1938).
63. Among others: "I don't know of any reason why there should not be a claim In
this case made against Standard, not only that the claim that they make should not be
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This proposed compromise called for substantially the same terms
outlined in the plan. Standard was ready to accept $5,000,000 for the
outstanding charges of over $9,000,000. The Special M~aster expressed
his fears that the trustee might lose all if the compromise were rejected
and thereupon approved it. 4 The Taylors reiterated the arguments of
Ramsey and concluded that Standard should be adjudged liable to Deep
Rock in an amount in excess of $20,000,000. The Special Master
awarded Standard $5,000,000.
The District Court
The hearings before the District Judge followed. Seemingly midway
in the hearing the District Judge interrupted:6
"Now there is no need to go any further with this argument. I am thoroughly
convinced. I have been studying this case, and that is the reason I had it set
down for further argument, my conscience wouldn't let me approve this com-
promise from just hearing the arguments. Here is $5,000,000.00 worth of
stock outstanding; somebody got that money from the public. Now under this
settlement if I was to approve it, and in approving the plan of reorganization
I would just as well say to the [preferred] stockholders, you are wiped out;
you get a little piece of paper called common stock that I wouldn't give one
cent for."
The District Judge had apparently reached a conclusion contrary to
that of the Special Master. He summed up his reasoning as falling un-
der the category of the instrumentality rule:
"The evidence is overwhelming that Standard ran this company; they officered
it; they capitalized it; it is just a child in their hands, and if there ever was a
case the law is clear on, it is nothing in the world but an instrumentality,
according to the admissions." 67
Had it not been for the Taylors the matter would have long ago been
disposed of, since everyone else seemed to be satisfied.'
At this stage all the issues had been looked into with the exception
of the Deep Rock counter charge of $20,000,000P2 The Master had
said: "I have, however, studiously endeavored to avoid a fixed and defi-
nite conclusion upon the primary questions of law and fact."70
allowed, but that they should be held liable for all debts of Deep Roc." Testimony
of George Ramsey in a Hearing on March 25, 1935, R. and B., II, 381.
64. R. and B., I, 200.
65. R. and B., I, 192. Id. at I, 201, 2.
66. Opinion of Judge Kennamer, R. and B., IIU, 406-7.
67. Ibid.
68. R. and B., II, 408.
69. Id. at II, 407.
70. From the Master's Appraisement of the Situation, R. and B., I, 194.
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The District Judge suggested a second compromise.71
"Suppose I let the matter stand without a date. If you cannot compromise
we want to get together and finally dispose of the claim on its merits."
The Second Compromise72
Some months later the reorganization committee presented an amended
plan, which contemplated the compromise of Standard's claim at $5,000,-
000 as before, and the organization of a new company which should
issue $10,000,000.00 par value of debentures and 520,000 shares of
common stock. The noteholders received an equivalent ten million in
notes of the new company. The preferred shareholders were again elim-
inated from their preferred position. For their seven million dollar in-
terest they were allotted one hundred thousand shares of the new common
stock. The upshot: " ... to Standard approximately seventy-three per-
cent, to the old preferred stockholders nineteen per cent, and to the note-
holders eight per cent of the common stock."73 Reduced to intelligible
terms there was equally nothing left for the preferred shareholders with
the claim compromised at five million as if left at nine million, since
Deep Rock was evaluated at seventeen million and twelve of that went
to the noteholders for principal and interest.
At the end of the District Court hearings the District Judge did not
hand down an opinion. He had made some comments on the way,7 4 but
his final order merely approved the offered compromise of Standard's
claim .75
The Circuit Court
The Taylors, as an Independent Committee representing the preferred
stockholders, appealed. "Counsel for the independent committee devoted
275 pages of their inordinate brief to the proposition that the Standard
claim should be disallowed on the merits. ' 7 The Circuit Court replied
however, that that was " ... not the issue here.... Whether a proposed
compromise of a claim against a debtor shall be approved rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court. 77 The validity of the claim to be
compromised was not considered by the Circuit Court.
The Taylors continued to stress the instrumentality rule. The Cir-
71. Opinion of the District Court, R. and B., II, 411.
72. Standard filed a petition in bankruptcy in September, 1935. 96 F. 2d 693, 700 (10th
Cir. 1938).
73. 306 U.S. 307, 314 (1939). See also: R. and B., I, 296; II, 731, 734; I, 33, 34,
74. R. and B., II, 410.
75. R. and B., I, 395.
76. 96 F. 2d 693, 703 (10th Cir. 1938).
77. Ibid.
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cuit Court then proceeded to consider the rule and indicated a realiza-
tion of its importance in the instance of Standard, Deep Rock and the
Byllesby system:
" ...the parent corporation will be responsible for the obligations of its
subsidiary when its control has been exercised to such a degree that the sub-
sidiary has become its mere instrumentality."78
There was no doubt of the Court's full preoccupation with the question
of instrumentality. 9 It regarded the rule with Justice Cardozo as "still
enveloped in the mists of metaphor,"8" but proceeded to spend many pages
in discussing it.81
Point by point the elements of the instrumentality rule were con-
sidered and dismissed. The court listed eleven elements:
(a) The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of
the subsidiary.
(b) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors
or officers.
(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the
subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation.
These four, the Court found to be present. It found the presence of the
following fairly debatable:
(e) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(h) In the papers of the parent corporation the subsidiary is described
as a department ... of the parent corporation, or its business
.. is referred to as the parent corporation's own.
The remaining five were held to be absent:
(f) The parent corporation pays the expenses or losses of the sub-
sidiary.
(g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent
corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent
corporation.
(i) The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its
own.
(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act indepen-
dently but take their orders from the parent corporation in the
latter's interest.
78. 96 F.2d 693, 704 (10th Cir. 1938).
79. Id. at 706.
80. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 94, 155 N. E. 58, 61 (1926).
81. 96 F. 2d 693, 704 et seq. (10th Cir. 1938).
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(k) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed.
The Circuit Court found strong support for the District Court's action
in approving the compromise.
The Circuit Court, however, did not treat the matters with silence as
had the District Court. With the exception of the claim on the merits,
it discussed each point in order. It referred to the dividends, and stated
that "A sufficient answer is that the evidence shows actual earnings .... 
82
It noted the financial situation as wholly controlled by Standard, but
concluded that since the parent corporation was the natural source
of the subsidiary's credit, the fact that the parent financed the sub-
sidiary would not render the subsidiary a mere instrumentality of the
parent. The Circuit Court remarked upon the stock ownership, the com-
plete identity of directors and officers, but concluded that such, without
more, would not justify the application of the instrumentality rule.
The Circuit Court concluded by referring to the "eminent counsel"
and to the Special Master as learned and of worthy judgment, and stated:
".. .we cannot say the result of the contest over the claim was not so
doubtful or the claim itself so devoid of merit as to form no reasonable
justification for the compromise."' The court had, however, already
regarded the counterclaim as " ... not the issue here .... "8
The Circuit Court Dissent
The Circuit Court had split two to one with Bratton, J., writing a
brief dissent. Chief reliance was on the instrumentality rule. " ...the
fiction of corporate entity should be disregarded when it is necessary
to circumvent fraud or uproot a harbor for wrong."80 In the mind of
the dissenting judge, the long list of indicia all pointed to the fact
that Deep Rock was an agency, department, or instrumentality of Stan-
dard. Bratton, J., concluded that advancements made in such circum-
stances could not constitute an indebtedness recognizable as a claim in
bankruptcy:
" ...allowance of the claim in any sum amounts to Standard asserting a
claim against itself in legal fraud of others ... it follows as the night the day
that the approval of this plan with the untenable claim ihcluded as a liability
of the corporation constituted a grave prejudice to the rights of others in
interest. It is respectfully submitted that the claim should have been disallowed
in toto; that the proposed plan of reorganization with the claim included should
82. Id. at 706.
83. Ibid.
84. Id. at 703.
85. Id. at 707.
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have been disapproved; and that for these reasons the orders should be re-
versed."86
The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and on February
27, 1939 a unanimous court07 handed down its decision and the "Deep
Rock doctrine" was born. Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the
court. With scattered exceptions, his whole opinion came in the last
three pages. He understood that "[p]etitioners had invoked the so-
called instrumentality rule. It is not, properly speaking, a rule, but a
convenient way of designating the application in particular circum-
stances of the broader equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate
entity, recognized generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded
when so to do would work fraud or injustice."'m He also noted that the
Taylors were basing their attack on the decree below on the instru-
mentality rule. He discussed this rule briefly, delineated exactly the
equitable duties of the bankruptcy court, sitting as a court of equity,
and stated specifically the court's duty to recognize the rights of the
preferred stockholders. He referred to the "abuses in management,"
"the interlocking directors," "the paramount interest" of the officers 'in
the preservation of Standard's position," the forced dividends, the dom-
inated management8 9 Justice Roberts did, however, feel it was im-
possible to recast Deep Rock's history so as even to approxdmate what
would be its financial condition had it been adequately capitalized and
independently managed with an eye single to its own interests. There
was not, however, any mention of the Deep Rock counterclaim.
The essence of the opinion came in the last paragraph and was con-
densed to the point of being cryptic:
"If a reorganization is effected the amount at which Standard's claim is
allowed is not important if it is to be represented by stock in the new company,
provided the stock to be awarded it is subordinated to that awarded preferred
stockholders. No plan ought to be approved which does not accord the pre-
ferred stockholders a right of participation in the equity in the Company's
assets prior to that of Standard, and at least equal voice with Standard in the
management. Anything less would be to remand them to precisely the status
which has inflicted serious detriment on them in the past." °
86. Id. at 710.
87. The Court was composed of Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McRe)nolds, BrandeLS
Stone, Reed, Black, Butler and Roberts. Justice Douglas had not yet been seated and
Justice Frankfurter did not take part in the decision.
88. 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939).
89. Id. passim, 303 to 323.-
90. Id. at 324.
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The Decision in Dollars and Cents
The implementation of the decision fell in course to the District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma. Reorganization plans were re-
ceived from both Standard and the Taylors. The Securities and Exchange
Commission entered at this point under its powers over corporate re-
organizations under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act and both plans
were submitted to it for examination. The Court placed great weight on
the work of the Commission embodied in its twenty-two page report.
This report, as revised by the figures finally used in the opinion of the
Circuit Court of Appeals,"' shows a full conspectus of the picture pre-
sented to the reorganization court. General creditors and reorganiza-
tion expenses were listed at $560,000. Deep Rock's 6% convertible
gold notes, plus accrued interest, amounted to $14,350,000 and the pre-
ferred stock, plus accrued dividends, to $8,272,500; a total of senior
claims amounting to $23,182,500. The common stock consisted of
599,475 shares, 20,830 of which were held by the public.
The report disagreed with the trustee's valuation of assets and re-
garded the District Court's finding of $17,000,000 as a maximum which
could be considerably lowered. The report, upon a 10% capitalization
of the total work of Deep Rock, estimated the value of the assets at
slightly over $7,000,000. Accordingly, the Securities and Exchange
Commission recommended rejection of both plans proposed. 2
The District Court acted in general accordance with the Securities and
Exchange Commission report, rejected both plans and approved a modi-
fied planY3 The plan as finally approved gave to the holders of gold
notes $5,500,000 of new debentures, 300,000 shares of stock and
$2,900,000 of cash (including interim distributions). The preferred
stockholders received 100,000 shares of stock. If we accept the evalu-
91. Standard Gas & Electric Company v. Deep Rock Oil Corporation et at., 117 F. 2d
615 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 564 (1941).
92. These contentions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are useful as back-
ground for the finally approved plan. They serve as an indication of the deep influence of
appraisal downward by the SEC on the action of the Federal District Court. In the plan
proposed by the Shinners Committee the capitalization would have taken the form of
$5,500,000 in 6% Sinking Fund Debentures, dated 1 January 1940 and maturing 31 De-
cember 1951. There were also to be 500,000 shares of common stock. All of the new
debentures and 400,00 shares of the common were to go to the presently outstanding gold
notes in full settlement. The remainder of the common was to go to the 50,000 shares of
preferred stock. The common stock was to receive nothing. Under the plan of the Inde-
pendent Preferred Stockholders' Committee the gold notes were to receive 5% Debentures
in the amount of $7,000,000 and half of the 500,000 shares of new common stock with
the preferred stockolders receiving the balance and the common stockholders eliminated.
93. The modified plan approved was contested by Standard without success. In re Deep
Rock Oil Corp., 113 F. 2d 266 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 699 (1940).
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ation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the noteholders re-
ceived $2,900,000 cash and debentures backed by assets worth approxi-
mately $3,700,000. The common stock they and the preferred stock-
holders received was apparently worthless.
The common stock held by the public which had been subordinated to
the preferred stock, was not considered by the court. With Deep Rock's
$20,000,000 counterclaim against Standard ignored, the position of
the publicly-held common stock was academic.
PART III: ANALYSIS OF THE ADJUDICATION
At the outset of any analysis of Deep Rock one very important point
should be remarked. The facts as narrated were substantially uncontro-
verted. Beyond this factual agreement there was accord on the duty of
the court. The action was a bankruptcy proceeding, and bankruptcy
always means equity.Y4 The court, therefore, had uncontroverted facts,
all the parties before it, and the duty of an equity court. 3
The Question Before the Court
The Court stated early in its opinion that "The question presented is
whether the District Court abused its discretion in approving the com-
promise of a claim .... ,G Some attention should be given to this formu-
lation of the question by the Court. The first step towards the basic
question is seemingly from consideration of discretion to that of the
compromise. The compromise, it is submitted, is prior in consideration
to the question of the exercise of discretion. This is because it is, inevit-
ably, an abuse of discretion if the compromise was in fact invalid. The
question, therefore, before the court is the validity of the compromise.
But that still would apparently not be the ultimate question. It is
difficult to speak of the validity of the compromise of a claim when
the intrinsic validity of that very claim has not yet been at least con-
sidered. It would not be judicious to pay an invalid claim. It would be,
at best, only half judicious to compromise a claim of questionable validity.
Judge Bratton in the Circuit Court dissent seemed to understand this.
"Whether a proposed plan of reorganization shall be approved rests in large
measure in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. But assuming that
the claim of Standard should not have been allowed in any sumi, it follows as
the night the day that the approval of this plan with the untenable claim in-
94. 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939). Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648
(1935).
95. See Consofldated Rock Products Company et al v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
96. 306 U. S. 307, 308 (1939).
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cluded as a liability of the corporation constituted a grave prejudice to the
rights of others in interest." 97
This question of the validity of the claim of Standard was in truth
a bifurcated one. Suppose that the claim in itself and without further
consideration of surrounding circumstances were valid, but that actually
Standard was in no position to be presenting any claim at all, valid or no.
That would pose another question beyond the question of the mere valid-
ity of the claimi. It could be said that this is nothing other than saying
that the claim is in itself invalid. Perhaps that is true. There is a point
for consideration, however. Another way to put that question would be:
Can Standard come in as a creditor? It is suggested that the determina-
tion of whether Standard can come in with any claim is a question that
is best answered before the validity of the claim Standard comes in with
is passed upon. Now the question might be: Can Standard present any
claim? There are many ways of putting this. Can Standard be con-
sidered a creditor at all? If Deep Rock is Standard, and Standard Deep
Rock, can Standard claim anything from Deep Rock? If Deep Rock is
a part of Standard, can a whole claim against its part?"8
Strictly this bifurcated question of the validity of the claim is answered
jointly. While the Court is determining if Standard can come in at all,
it must perforce consider each of the elements in the claim that would
render the claim bona fide. This is precisely what the Court does do.
It considers each item of the claim, and of necessity, decides the general
position of Standard while considering the several items of the claim
in globo.
The Supreme Court was cognizant of this. It adverts to the fact that
neither of the lower courts, or the Special Master ever passed on the
question of the claim on its merits. 9 It is difficult to understand how
the Court maintained such steadfast silence on the matter of Deep Rock's
alleged counterclaim.
It is finally proposed, therefore, that the ultimate question of the Court
was a viewing of the equities of the parties. It could be otherwise ex-
pressed as a concurrent determination of the validity of Standard's claim
on the one hand and of Deep Rock's counterclaim on the other. With
this over-all view, the proper order of questions would not be first dis-
cretion, nor allowance, nor compromise, nor even claim alone. Ulti-
mately the question would then be: Has Standard a claim, or had Deep
97. 96 F. 2d 693, 710 (10th Cir. 1938).
98. See Bratton, J., expressed the same concept in his dissent: " . . . the allowance
of the claim in any sum amounts to Standard asserting a claim against itself . .. " 96 F.
2d 693, 710 (10th Cir. 1938).
99. 306 U. S. 307, 313 (1939).
[Vol. 19
DEEP ROCK DOCTRINE CONSIDERED
Rock a counterclaim? or: What are the substantial equities of all the
parties?
The Ultimate Factual Determinations
The Court proceeded slowly to answer the question before it. In so
doing, it handed down adjudications. They were not, any one of them,
the final conclusions of the case, but they were essential pronouncements
that would finally, in mass, form the basis for the ultimate conclusions
of law. These determinations formed a pattern that was later to stand
out in the decision of the case. This pattern is the "instrumentality
principle", with the several elements of it forming the inner design, and
the totality of the elements forming the pattern as a whole.
This pattern that the Court followed can be described in many terms,
but it expresses an elemental concept under any guise. To the Circuit
Court it was a case of "... looking through the fiction of distinct
entity.... M'oo Perhaps the most fortuitous expression of the essence of
the concept came from Bratton, J.:
"A parent corporation may not assume the position of creditor and assert
a claim in bankruptcy against its subsidiary which has been dominated and
controlled as a mere adjunct, department, or instrumentality, since the assertion
of a claim in such circumstances amounts to the presentation of a claim against
itself in fraud of bona fide creditors. (Cases cited)."x1D
The Supreme Court put the same concept in its own way but refused
to designate the instrumentality principle as a rule, referring to it rather
as 'ca convenient way of designating the application ... of the broader
equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity... will not be
regarded when to do so would work fraud or injustice."1 2
Although the Supreme Court did not devote many words beyond those
already noted to the intricacies of the rule, it stated that it had carefully
read the opinion below. Phillips, J., for the majority had detailed the
various elements of the rule elaborately. Just prior to this enumeration
he had quoted Powell on Parent and Subsidiary'0 3 and had proceeded to
list the eleven general elements that could comprise the "so-called instru-
mentality rule". These general categories have been stated already, and
since they are a good workable break-down of the concept, and the Su-
preme Court followed them in fact, though perhaps not in enunciated
formality, they will form the pattern on which the Supreme Court's
lO. 96 F. 2d 693, 706 (loth Cir. 1938).
i01. Id. at 708.
102. 306 U. S. 307, 322 (1939).
103. '96 F. 2d 693, 704 (10th Cir. 1938). See PowELL, PAm.rn' aD Suusmriim Conroau-
-EONS 8 (1931).
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reasoning will be laid. The relevant factual determinations which com-
prise these elements occupied the bulk of the highest Court's opinion.
The Indicia of Instrumentality
The Capital Stock Ownership. The Circuit Court had described the
first element as: "The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital
stock of the subsidiary."'" 4 The Supreme Court makes occasional refer-
ences throughout the opinion to the total ownership of Deep Rock stock
by Standard, and adequately treated the matter of complete ownership
of capital stock by Standard.
Common Directors and Officers. Throughout the opinion the fact of
the interlocking directorate was recurred to.' 0 The Court finally grouped
all the factual information concerning the common directors and officers
in one conclusive phrase: ". . . the paramount interest of interlocking
officers and directors in the preservation of Standard's position. . . ."0
This element was the second of the four elements admittedly present in
the enumeration of the Circuit Court.
The Parent Corporation Finances the Subsidiary. The Supreme Court
spent little time in elaborating this point. It summarized its stand in one
sentence: Standard "... was its banker and its only source of financial
aid.,,Mo7
The Parent Incorporates the Subsidiary. The whole story of the Deep
Rock was open to the Court in the records and briefs including the testi-
mony of Standard's president: "So we got into the oil business that
way."'08 The Court speaks of the organization in 1919 and then concludes
the matter:--" ... Byllesby, an investment banking corporation which
controlled Standard, entered into a contract with Shaffer whereby he was
to organize.... " Deep Rock. ". . . Standard then had investments in
various utility properties but had never been interested in oil."
100
Inadequate Capitalization. Of all the indicia of corporate identity in
the law of parent and subsidiary, the fact of inadequate initial and con-
tinued capitalization is generally regarded as one of the most cogent.110
Such inadequacy sets the legal mind to thinking that here is rather a
104. Ibid.
105. 306 U. S. 307, 310 (1939).
106. Id. at 323.
107. Id. at 311.
108. R. and B., 1I, 2.
109. 306 U. S. 307, 309 (1939).
110. See Luckenbach S.S. Co., Inc. v. W. R. Grace & Co., Inc., 267 Fed. 676 (4th Cir.
1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 644 (1920). Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage
Co., 178 Okla. 15, 61 P. 2d 645 (1936); LAmrY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFrIIATED CORPORATIONS,
113, 140, 194, 197, 216 (1936).
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joint enterprise than separate entities; that rather the financing is con-
tinuing, and should as a consequence be continued to its logical conclusion.
Such thoughts might well have been at the base of the Court's mind when
it said: "So inadequate was Deep Rock's capitalization that, in the period
from organization to 1926, the balance due on open account to Standard
grew to more than $14,800,000. " Il1 This risk-nothing and gain-all atti-
tude of Standard's was prominent in the Court's thinking: "From its
organization Deep Rock was, most of the time, 'two jumps ahead of the
wolf,' as one of Standard's officers testified."" At another point: "As
before, Deep Rock's resources were wholly insufficient for its business
and the open account began to build up. . .. ": It is interesting to
note that the Circuit Court majority had concluded that the presence of
this element of undercapitalization "... may be said to be fairly debat-
able." The Supreme Court, on the other hand, had concluded: "From
the outset Deep Rock was insufficiently capitalized, was top-heavy with
debt and was in parlous financial condition."
Parent's Use of Subsidiary's Property. A favorite term with the Court
when referring to Standard is "proprietor". It refers to Standard".. . as
at once proprietor and creditor of Deep Rock."1 4 This proprietorship
manifested itself, in the mind of the Court, in connection with the depen-
dence upon Standard of Deep Rock officers.
Domination and Control. Were any one of the several elements of the
concept of corporate identity of would-be entities to be called the most
important it would be that of domination and control. If one corporation,
exercises such thorough domination over another it is apparent that the
subsidiary has no life of its own, that it can be called nothing but a
"department" or "adjunct" or "instrumentality". Essentially what faced
the Court in determining whether Standard could present a claim against
Deep Rock was the question: to what extent did Standard lead and
direct Deep Rock's life for it so that it could be said that not Deep Rock
but Standard lived, that Deep Rock had no body or life except as a part
of Standard's life and body. This explains why the Court devoted so
much of its time to considerations surrounding domination. More
ample treatment was required to picture the "stranglehold",'" as the
111. 306 U. S. 307, 315 (1939).
112. Id. at 310.
113. Id. at 316. It is interesting to note that the Circuit Court majority had concluded
that the presence of this element of undercapitalization " . . . may be said to be fairly
debatable." 96 F. 2d 693, 705 (10th Cir. 193S). The Supreme Court on the other hand, had
concluded: "From the outset Deep Rock was insufficiently capitalized, was top-heavy with
debt and was in parlous financial condition." 306 U. S. 307, 315 (1939).
114. 306 U. S. 307, 323 (1939).
115. Id. at 315.
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Court called it, which Standard had on Deep Rock. The Court gives a
summary of its stand on the question of domination:
"It is impossible within the compass of this opinion to detail the numerous
other transactions evidenced by the books of the two companies many of which
were to the benefit of Standard and to the detriment of Deep Rock. All of them
were accomplished through the complete control and domination of Standard
and without the participation of the preferred stockholders who had no voice or
vote in the management of Deep Rock's affairs .... n. 4. At no time did Stan-
dard have less than a majority of the voting stock outstanding.""10
Internal Domination - Properties. The Court indicated fully the
control of Standard over Deep Rock Properties,117 reciting how in 1922
Standard decided that, in view of the unsatisfactory progress of Deep
Rock, earnings must be increased by the acquisition of additional oil
properties and by the erection of a modern gasoline cracking plant; how
part or all of the sums expended for the acquisition of the oil properties
were advanced by Standard to Deep Rock and charged against the latter.
The Court traced all the maneuverings in and around Standard, Deep
Rock and the Refining Company, including the formation in 1922 of the
Deep Rock Oil and Refining Company by Standard, with the intention
that it should take title to the oil properties and the cracking plant.
The Court then detailed the abrupt shift of ownership from Deep Rock
to the new Refining Company, the equally sudden transfer of the Refin-
ing Company, with the ownership of the properties, to Standard. The
Court summed up the domination of Standard over the properties of
Deep Rock:
"Thus, on the face of things, Standard, through ownership of the capital stock
of Refining Company, owned and controlled the Bradstreet properties and the
cracking plant and put itself in such a position that, without its continued co-
operation, Deep Rock could not function.""n8
Internal Domination-Leases. Full attention is called to the lease of
these properties back to Deep Rock'" at the dictation of Standard's
officials and the immediate declaration of the rentals by the Refining
Company as a dividend to Standard, and the debiting to Deep Rock of
such as was not paid by Standard in the open account. Under this lease
Deep Rock paid, or became obligated to Standard, in the total of
$3,075,000. The Court adds: "During the term of the lease the oper-
ations of the leased properties showed a net loss of $30,401.40."120 The
116. Id. at 320.
117. Id. at 317.
118. Id. at 318.
119. Id. at 319.
120. Ibid.
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Court concluded the matter of the leases in a remark that typified its
attitude towards all the lease arrangements:
"In spite of the losses entailed upon Deep Rock by the lease arrangement,
Standard dictated its renewal for another term of five years commencing October
1, 1930, and from that date to the receivership Deep Rock paid, or was debited
by Standard with, $1,450,000, as rental and suffered, in the operation of the
properties leased, a total loss of $1,584,458.05. -121
Internal Domination-Interest and Fees. There was no dilation on the
matter of interest and fees:
"During the whole period from 1919 to the receivership, Standard charged
Deep Rock interest at the rate of seven per cent. per annum compounded
monthly on the balance shown by the open account. During the entire period
the Management Corporation charged Deep Rock with round annual sums for
management and supervision of Deep Rock's affairs which totaled $1,219,034.83,
all of which Standard assumed and charged into the open account!"~
Dividends. Throughout its opinion the Court reverts from time to
time to the payment of dividends declared in the face of the fact that
Deep Rock had not the cash available to pay them and was, at the time,
borrowing in large amounts from or through Standard. The Court
emphasized the inability to pay these dividends:
"Whatever may be the fact as to the legality of such dividends judged by
the balance sheets and earnings statements of Deep Rock, it is evident that
they would not have been paid over a long course of years by a company on
the precipice of bankruptcy and in dire need of cash working capital."' -
With Standard owning 98% of the common, and the dividends going
to the common, this single factor was perhaps the most flagrant act of
domination in the fourteen year history. Yet the Court felt:
"This is only one of the aspects in which Standard's management and control
has operated to the detriment of Deep Rock's financial condition and ability to
function. Others are apparent from what has been said and from a study of
the record."'2
Scattered throughout the opinion the Court makes other general con-
clusions, albeit on the proximate level, which dispose of the several
elements of the instrumentality theory in a mass. For example:
"Deep Rock finds itself bankrupt not only because of the enormous sums
it owes Standard but because of the abuses in management due to the para-
121. Ibid.
122. Id. at 320.
123. Id. at 323.
124. Ibid.
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mount interest of interlocking officers and directors in the preservation of Stan-
dard's position, as at once proprietor and creditor of Deep Rock.1 125
The Court did not omit comment on the false annual statements, the
market manipulations, the domination by Byllesby of the Reorganization
Committee.
In short the Court expressed its conclusions as to every salient point
in the long history of the enterprises. At this point the Court has pre-
sented the results of its study, has reviewed in the form of ultimate factual
determinations every operation up to the date of the argument, and had
gone far towards the ultimate conclusion. The Court had announced at
the very outset: "Without going into the minutiae of the transactions
between the two companies, enough may be stated to expose the reasons
for our decision."' 26 Thus far, then, we have seen the reasons of the
Court. There remains to consider the decision itself in the light of these
reasons.
The Ultimate Conclusions of Law
To find, analyze, and try to fit together a nexus between the reasons
and conclusions of the case is in effect the nub of the discussion. There
is no possible substitution for sound reasoning. Reasons either support
conclusions, or they do not. Any amount of persiflage, or e contra evasion
of the point, cannot answer for logical progression from cause to effect,
from reasons to conclusions. The Court had presented its relevant factual
evaluations. What of the nexus between these and the ultimate conclu-
sions springing from thenf? The Court had presented its first premise
and had done so thoroughly, step by step and in detail. This first premise
contained every constitutive element generally attributed to the basic
concept variously denoted the "instrumentality doctrine" a "broad equi-
table principle", a "rule", or simply a principle, doctrine or concept. To
have such a first premise so clearly defined and delineated is an appre-
ciable step along the way to the conclusion.
As a matter of fact what the Court had so laboriously laid down was
its minor premise. It had said: Deep Rock has all these elements.
Knowledge and an understanding of the major premise should, without
more, lead to the conclusion. The law of the United States supplies the
major premise. The joining of the major and the minor results in a
conclusion.
What are the precedents? What is the major premise to the Court's
minor premise which the norms of stare decisis have supplied? The major
has always been: Where the elements of the instrumentality concept are
125. Ibid.
126. Id. at 315.
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present there is identity of the parent with the subsidiary. This fills out
the syllogism: Elements of concept equal identity of parent and sub-
sidiary. But Deep Rock presents elements of concept. Therefore, Deep
Rock results in identity with parent.
The Writers
Probably one of the most thorough treatments of the question of
identity of parent and subsidiary has been presented by LattyYl Latty
takes the pains to point out what has been well discussed here, that by
whatever name, handle or description the concept is given, the essence
is the same, and the result is the same: identity of parent and subsidiary.
Identity results ipso facto from the disregard of the entity. Latty stresses
this point. He is concerned lest one accuse him of a mechanical and rigid
rule. He emphasized the rule's pliable nature, and reiterates the result:
"What the formula comes down to, once shorn of verbiage about control,
instrumentality, and corporate entity, is that liability is imposed to reach an
equitable result."' l2s
It should be eminently clear that Latty is not concerned a whit at this
point with the elements that go into the "instrumentality notion", as he
calls it, but only with the consequences of the presence of these elements.
In other words, he is concerned now only with the major premise: the
elements of the notion equal identityY02
Other writers speak the same result. The treatment is substantially
the same in most of the authorities 30
127. LATry, SuBsmwixus AND AruTarD CoRpoRATio0s 157 (1936).
128. Id. at 191.
129. There is a very important dialectical point that should be discussed here. The ten-
dency is to conclude, not simply identity of parent and subsidiary, but, more important,
liability of parent for the debts of the subsidiary. Latty has certainly yielded to the tendency.
The reason for this inclination to impose liability and not merely identity is that in the
majority of cases in practice the next step and result from identity is liability of parent
for the debts of the subsidiary. The instrumentality rule will, first, identify the two, and
because of the identity, declare the parent liable for the debts of the subsidiary. But this
is not the inevitable outcome of the rule in all cases. The declaration of identily is always
the result, but after that, should the facts conceivably so occur, the identity might result,
among other things in a general commingling of assets, or in the liability, in effect of the
subsidiary for the debts of the parent. In short, the instrumentality rule effects identity,
and the logical cousequences of identity result in any number of possible outcomes, all
portraying the reality behind the fiction, the most usual of which is liability of parent for
the debts of the subsidiary. Here, therefore, the tendency to refer to liability as comitant
with identity must be resisted until an analysis will indicate whether that is the next step
in the Deep Rock case after identity has been effected. This point, moreover, should be
recalled in all the instances and comparisons adduced passim.
130. Thus Powell was quoted extensively in the opinion of Phillips, J. in the Circuit
Court (96 F. 2d 693 (10th Cir. 1938)).
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The Courts
Since the courts and the writers have been in accord on this matter
of liability, the word on the courts can be brief. Possibly the first expres-
sion of the concept came in 1909 in the Watertown Paper Case."'
The most well-known of the instrumentality cases has always been the
Chicago Railway Case.132 There is nothing novel in the case, but the
language of the opinion 33 is frequently quoted to substantiate the point
that, once the elements are posited, only one conclusion can follow.
But it should be understood that the result is identity of parent and
subsidiary not because the courts and the writers have repeatedly so
pronounced it when the elements of instrumentality have been found.
The result is identity because of the intrinsic necessity of the reasoning
involved in the entire concept. This inherent reasonableness must be
stressed. It eliminates any thought of a mechanical rule.
These fundamental considerations lead to the next important question:
-what did the Court do in the light of these principles?
The Decision Itself
In the ultimate factual determinations the Court had systematically
spelt out its minor premise: Standard has the elements which commonly
constitute the instrumentality doctrine. It is submitted that there could
be only one conclusion: Identity, and identity here means Standard is
liable.1'4 What, however, is the Court's conclusion? Exactly the opposite.
It allows the Standard claim of $5,000,000 and disallows the Deep Rock
counterclaim of $20,000,000. That is not all the Court does, but for an
immediate summary that is the essential point. There are lesser consider-
ations that serve to highlight this one central core, but the allowance of
the Standard claim in the face of the reasoning preceding it is the decision
of the Court in a word. It further is a summary of the burden of this
commentary and should be borne in mind throughout the subsequent
analysis.
131. In re Watertown Paper Co., 169 Fed. 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1909).
132. Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. v. Minn. Civic Ass'n., 247 U. S. 490 (1918).
133. " . . . where stock ownership has been resorted to, not for the purpose of partici-
pating in the affairs of a corporation in the normal and usual manner, but for the purpose
... of controlling a subsidiary company so that it may be used as a mere agency or Instru-
mentality of the owning company .... In such a case the courts will not permit themselves
to be blinded or deceived by mere forms or law but, regardless of fictions will deal with
the substance of the transaction involved as if the corporate agency did not exist and as
the justice of the case may requtre." Id. at 501.
134. As the analysis of the opinion proceeds it will be seen that here is one of the
many instances where the presence of the elements of instrumentality does actually equal
liability, since the circumstances render "identity" in effect "liability". See footnote 128 supra.
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The Supreme Court and Judge Bratton's Dissent
The Supreme Court said:
"A majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals... concluded that the District
Court had not exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion in granting its
approval. One judge thought that the instrumentality rule was applicable;
that, under the rule, Standard had no provable claim; and that it was an abuse
of discretion to approve the compromise and the reorganization plan. We
agree with the conclusion of the dissenting judge, but for different reasons."25
A tendency on the part of the Court was apparent to avoid a solid
stand or openly enunciat a reason for the final disposition. But here
are two unconditional statements. First, what was Judge Bratton's con-
clusion? It was that the Standard claim should have been disallowed in
toto. 30 Yet the Supreme Court concluded that the Standard claim be
allowed. Perhaps the Supreme Court meant that both itself and Judge
Bratton held for reversal. That, however, is not reaching the same con-
clusion from reasoned premises. Judge Bratton developed the elements
of the instrumentality rule, just as the Supreme Court did, but the respec-
tive final conclusions from these premises differed as the night from the
day. In fact, from same premises there resulted diametrically opposite
conclusions.
Second, what were Judge Bratton's reasons? While he recognized
-that mere predominant stock ownership would not warrant the dis-
regard of separate juridical entities, Judge Bratton took cognizance
of the established rule that stock ownership, when utilized in an ab-
normal manner for the purpose of domination, called for treatment
of the subsidiary as the parent's agent and instrumentality. The
logical conclusion followed that such a parent corporation could not
assume the position of a creditor and successfully assert a claim in bank-
ruptcy against its instrumentality, i.e. against itself in fraud of bona fide
creditors. Both Judge Bratton and the Supreme Court went through the
same detailed process of reasoning. One concluded with a logical appli-
cation of the instrumentality concept, the other with an anomalous appli-
cation-or rather a total failure of application-of the principle.
The Supreme Court and the Instrumentality Ride
After adverting to the preferred stockholders' reliance upon the instru-
mentality rule and its extensive discussion in the court below, the Su-
preme Court said of the rule:
"It is not properly speaking, a rule, but a convenient way of designating
135. 306 U. S. 307, 314 (1939). (Italics supplied).
136. 96 F. 2d 693, 710 (10th Cir. 1938).
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the application, in particular circumstances, of the broader equitable principle
that the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized generally and for most purposes,
will not be regarded when so to do would work fraud or injustice. This principle
has been applied in appropriate circumstances, to give minority stockholders
redress against wrongful injury to their interests by a majority stockholder. It
must be apparent that the preferred stockholders of Deep Rock assert such
injury by Standard as the basis of their attack on the decree below." 187
These are among the most significant words in the opinion of the Supreme
Court. They have tended to confuse somewhat the greater number of
writers who have attempted a study of the case and have led to difficulty
for the courts. They come so parlously close to a definite stand that some
commentators have confusedly assumed that the stand was taken. Yet,
in spite of the painstaking use of the constitutive elements of the rule
throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court only comes to mention the
rule itself at this very late stage. What has the Court said? First, that
the instrumentality doctrine, is not strictly a rule. Second, that as an
"equitable principle" the doctrine accomplishes what is generally attrib-
uted to the same concept as a "rule". It prefers not to use the word
"rule", but to call it an "equitable principle". Disregarding semantics,
there is no essential change in the heart of the doctrine. The corporate
entity is still disregarded when injustice would result. The parent, once
its entity is disregarded, is still liable for the just debts of the subsidiary.
But there is far more important cause for notice in the first quoted
sentence than the fact that the Supreme Court simply designates a new
name for the old concept. The Court takes no definite stand on the
matter. It has said the rule was much discussed below, but has not said
whether it, the Supreme Court, agrees or disagrees with the discussion.
It opines that properly speaking it is not a rule, but does not say whether
it espouses or repudiates the improperly-called rule as applied to the
facts of the case before it. It says that it is "a broader equitable prin-
ciple", but again, whether as rule or equitable principle, there is no word
as to where the Court stands in regard to it in the "particular circum-
stances" of the Deep Rock case. Thus far the treatment is academic.
And the next sentence? It would seem to be much the same. This
principle-the Court continues to call it a "principle"-has been appro-
priately applied to redress the wrongs of minority stockholders against
wrongful injuries by the majority. Would not the Court feel that that is
a pari the situation in the Deep Rock case; that the preferred stock-
holders are those very minority stockholders; that there are public mi-
nority common stockholders; and that the Court itself has seemingly
enumerated the wrongful injuries?
137. 306 U. S. 307, 322 (1939).
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That brings up the last sentence of the quotation, which serves to draw
severe and sharp the lines of opposition and demark the opposing con-
tentions clearly. But there is still no disclosure of which side is the
Court's. It has refused to take either side, in spite of its e.xpressed
consonance with Judge Bratton's conclusion.
The Court adds an explanation of the powers of an equity court under
the provisions of the National Bankruptcy Act, which permits realign-
ment of the rights of stockholders or general modifications, and continues
to permit full exercise of equity powers. To this point there have been
occasional references to equity and fairness, and considerable academic
treatment of the instrumentality rule, but yet no discernible stand on
the rule itself.
It might be expected that the nexus between all the factual determi-
nations and the ultimate disposition is at last at hand. The Court
approaches closer:
"In the present case there remains an equity after satisfaction of the cred-
itors in which only the preferred stockholders and Standard can have an interest.
Equity requires the award to preferred stockholders of a superior position in
the reorganized company."' 38
Here there must be a stop. The first sentence, in the light of all that
has transpired, in the light of the simple facts of the case, is very difficult
to understand. Why no mention of the public minority common stock-
holders? Why should Standard "have an interest"? The language would
seem to exclude Standard from the group of creditors. Yet later the Court
seems to do just the opposite. And the second sentence. Just when it
was thought that the Court might come out clearly and say that, since
all the elements of the instrumentality principle were present, Standard
should be held liable for the debts of Deep Rock, the opposite occurs.
The last quoted words are the final conclusion. And the conclusion is
apparently given without benefit of nexus with the ultimate factual deter-
minations, or of the precedents demanding identity and consequent
liability of Standard.
The Misposition of the Allowed Claim
In its adjudication, the Court did two things. It first allowed the
Standard's claim, and disallowed Deep Rock's counterclaim. That was
implicit in the statement of the decision. If the claim is to come after
the preferred holders, it is obvious it has been allowed30 But second
138. 306 U. S. 307, 323 (1939).
139. It is illuminating to read the words of the Circuit Court of Appeals (in the later
implementation of the Supreme Court's decision) commenting on this allowance: "If,
before the final consummation of any plan of reorganization, the assets of Deep Rock
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the Court transplanted this allowed claim, moved it out of its proper
order and placed it behind the preferred stockholders. Properly as a
holder of an allowed claim, as an unsecured creditor, Standard would
have its usual place after the secured creditors and before all stock-
holders. In bankruptcy it is axiomatic that the entrepreneur who fur-
nishes the risk capital should be the last to be paid off-unless he is at
the same time also a creditor.14° Did" the Supreme Court determine that
Standard was a creditor? It might seem not. Else why was Standard's
claim subordinated to that of the preferred stockholders?' And yet the
claim of the proprietor-entrepreneur, Standard, was actually allowed,
placed, it is true, out of a creditor position but ahead of the common
stock, a minority of which was held by the public. The only explanation
offered is the one word "equity".
Finally, the Court asserted that the same considerations which justified
the District Court in rejecting the first offer of compromise required a
rejection of the second. But the only reason which compelled the first
rejection was the finding that Deep Rock was Standard's mere instru-
mentality. 42
One sentence appearing at the end of the opinion adds somewhat to
its understanding:
should so increase in value that there would be a substantial equity to be applied to the
satisfaction of Standard's claim, the court under its broad equitable powers would have
power to procure a modification of the plan to make available this equity to Standard. The
present status of Deep Rock sustains the finding of the court that there Is no equity
to be applied to the satisfaction of Standard's claim. . . .We think the trial court correctly
interpreted the mandate of the Supreme Court to require that the claim of the note holders
be first satisfied; that the claim of the preferred stockholders be next satisfied; and that
any balance remaining belonged to Standard." In re Deep Rock Oil Corporation. Standard
Gas & Electric Co. v. Taylor et al., 113 F. 2d 266, 269 (10th Cir. 1940).
140. Salomon v. Salomon & Co., Ltd., (1897) A. C. 22.
141. The inclusion of a class of security holders in a plan or reorganization depends
upon the existence of an equity for that class. A plan is not "fair and equitable" unless It
provides participation for claims and interests in recognition of their priorities, and the
value of the debtor's properties supports the extent of the participation accorded to each
participating class. The allocation of any participation to stockholders, except on the basis
of a contribution, is unfair to the creditors and, therefore, illegal. Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 308 U. S. 106 (1939). The same principal has been applied
as between senior and junior creditors, (In re 620 Church Street Bldg. Corp., 299 U. S. 24
(1936)), between creditors and stockholders of a solvent corporation, (In re Chicago Great
Western Ry., 29 F. Supp. 149 (N. D. Ill. 1939)) ; Cf. Tellier v. Franks Laundry Co., 101
F. 2d 561 (8th Cir. 1939), and between classes of stockholders (In re Utilities Power and
Light Co., 29 F. Supp. 763 (N. D. Ill. 1939)) ; In re National Food Products Corp., 23 F.
Supp. 979 (D. Md. 1938). Rembar, Claims Against Affiliated Companies in Reorganization,
39 COL. L. Rnv. 907 (1939). See also 25 VA. L. REv. 849 (1939).
142. R. and ti., II, 406-407.
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"If a reorganization is effected the anount at which Standard's claim is allowed
is not important, if it is to be represented by stock in the new company, provided
the stock to be awarded it is subordinated to that awarded preferred stock-
holders."' 43 No attention is paid to the publicly held common stock. This either
bodes completely ill for the success of the envisaged corporation or the Supreme
Court was rather free with its disposition of the stock. On the whole it is diffi-
cult to explain. The common stock in the reorganized corporation was asset-less
only because Deep Rock's counterclaim was disallowed.
The Deep Rock Counterclaim
Had Deep Rock's counterclaim against Standard been allowed, Deep
Rock would have been restored to solvency and a going concern. The
noteholders would not find only $3,700,000 to satisfy their $5,500,000 in
new notes and their 300,000 shares of common stock. The preferred
stockholders would have something behind their share of the new common
stock and even the public minority common stockholders, who were alto-
gether ignored throughout, would be protected. "Equity, called for an
audit. Though repeatedly requested, no unpartial audit had ever been
given."'
The reorganization court had appropriate jurisdiction not only to allow
the $20,000,000 counterclaim as an offset against Standard's claim but
to permit, in the proceedings themselves, a recovery by Deep Rock
against Standard on the counterclaim. 4  But in the end there was no
word of the counterclaim.
The Conclusions of the Analysis
The Court was faced with an uncontroverted set of facts. Its duty was
the duty of the court of equity. There was no obstacle to substantial
justice. The question was clear: the claim, the counterclaim, the over-all
equities of the parties. From the facts the Court came forward with a
long series of ultimate factual determinations. Into the pattern of the
instrumentality principle the Court wove the capital stock ownership, the
interlocking directorates, the undercapitalization, the complete domina-
tion, leases, fees, interest, dividends,-all the indicia of instrumentality.
To this minor premise was added the major,--the clear precedents of
the courts: elements of instrumentality equal identity and consequent
liability.
143. 306 U. S. 307, 324 (1939) (italics supplied).
144. R. and B., 11, 437, 525. See Field, The Instrumentality Doctrine in Reorgaidzation
of Subsidiary Corporations, 9 Aimxsc= LAW SCHOOi REVmIw 728, 733 (1940).
145. In re Cuyahoga Finance Co., 136 F. 2d 18 (6th Cir. 1943). In re International
Power Securities Corporation, 170 F. 2d 399 (3d Cir. 1948).
146. Alexander v. Hlinman, 296 U. S. 222 (1935) ; Florence v. Kresge, 93 F. 2d 784, 786
(4th Cir. 1938); Chase National Bank v. Lyford, 147 F. 2d 273 (2d Cir. 194S).
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As a conclusion to this line of reasoning, the court allowed the Standard
claim in the amount of $5,000,000, but moved it out of priority to a place
behind the preferred stock but in front of the common stock. The pre-
ferred stock is to get something, the common stock nothing. The Deep
Rock counterclaim is disallowed and hence Deep Rock is insolvent.
It is submitted that these conclusions of the legal analysis substantially
support the declaration, recalling the words of the initial statement of
the thesis of this article, that basically the Deep Rock 'doctrine' essentially
impugns the instrumentality rule and tradition, that it might even be
said to repudiate it, but at the least it may be said to be a failure to carry
through the instrumentality principle to its reasonable conclusion.4
147. This is the first of two articles by Mr. Bayne on the celebrated Deep Rock case.
The second article, containing PART IV: DEEP ROCK AS A DOCTRINE and PART V: SUBSEQUENT
HiSToRY OF E DocTRNE AND CONCLUSION, will appear in the June issue of the FORDHAM
LAw REVIEw.
